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The 1938 Holmes Case and Challenging the Statutory 
Authority of the Commission of Government
Melvin Baker
Introduction
On 16 February 1934 a British-appointed Commission of Govern-
ment was inaugurated in St. John’s. The legislature of the Dominion of 
Newfoundland agreed to suspend responsible government during the 
height of the Great Depression when it was unable to meet interest 
payments on its funded debt because of the sharp decline in resource- 
based revenues from fishery, forestry, and mineral exports. The 
Commission had been adopted on the recommendation of a Royal 
Commission established by the British government a year earlier at 
the request of the Newfoundland government. The six-member Com-
mission of Government had three Newfoundland and three British 
members, all selected by London and presided over by a British- 
appointed governor. It had full legislative and executive powers subject 
to the supervisory control of the British government, the Gover-
nor-in-Commission being responsible to the Secretary of State for 
Dominion Affairs. This undemocratic government continued until 
1949 when Newfoundland joined Canada, following a majority refer-
endum vote in July 1948.1
Although Newfoundland was without democracy during the 
Commission era, the disenfranchised citizenry did confront state au-
thority, often through the courts. This article examines one such instance 
when, in 1938, tensions flared between the unelected Commission 
and the people and business community it governed. The conflict 
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arose when a St. John’s fish exporter, A.C. Holmes, sought a writ of 
mandamus from the Newfoundland Supreme Court ordering the 
Newfoundland Fisheries Board to grant him an export license.2 Both 
the Board and the Commission saw the writ as threatening their 
efforts at fishery reform and reorganization, thereby prompting the 
Commission to act swiftly to enact amending legislation to override 
the Court’s action. Although the business community was concerned 
over the Commission’s running roughshod over Holmes’s rights, in 
the end it accepted the Commission’s action for the overall good of the 
economy. The Holmes case, a little known event in the history of the 
Commission,3 shows how an unelected government went too far in 
undermining a judicial ruling, how the disenfranchised public and the 
press reacted to that overreach, and the sensitivity of that government 
to public criticism. 
Establishment of the Newfoundland Fisheries Board
One of the major goals of the Commission in 1934 was the “rehabili-
tation” of the Newfoundland economy and society along the lines sug-
gested in the 1933 Royal Commission Report. For Sir John Hope 
Simpson, the first Commissioner for Natural Resources,4 this could be 
achieved through greater government control over the fishery, espe-
cially through the production and export marketing of fishery products. 
In 1936 the Commission established the Newfoundland Fisheries 
Board and appointed St. John’s lawyer and former Board of Trade 
president Raymond Gushue as its first chair.5 The new Fisheries Board, 
it was hoped, would overcome the deep-rooted suspicion between 
fishermen and merchants and end cutthroat competition among mer-
chants in export markets.6 Its formation followed nearly three decades 
of efforts by various Newfoundland governments and the Newfound-
land Board of Trade (established in 1909)7 to provide better regulation 
over the production and marketing of salt codfish to foreign markets, 
especially to the major markets of Portugal, Spain, and Italy. Past fail-
ures had been the result of the competitive self-interest and inability 
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of exporters, mostly based in St. John’s, to agree on how that regula-
tion would work.8
Section 7 of the 1936 Newfoundland Fisheries Board Act9 gave 
the Board wide authority to “make rules and regulations” and allowed 
it to “alter, amend and repeal the same from time to time” respecting 
the catching, curing, preparation, processing, grading, packing, brand-
ing, and marketing of fish for export. The Board regulated “sales and 
shipments of fish to the several markets,” while giving the Gover-
nor-in-Commission authority to impose a fine or imprisonment or 
both for a breach of any rules and regulations, as well as the authority 
to suspend or cancel an export license. Other sections of the Act gave 
the Fisheries Board powers to issue export licenses and to refuse li-
censes for export of any firm. The Board could designate markets 
where no fish could be sold or consigned until a license for such sale 
or consignment had been obtained. Specifically, subsection 5 authorized 
the Board, “subject to the approval of the Governor-in-Commission[,] 
to make rules and regulations relating to sales or consignments to such 
designated markets and alter, amend and repeal of the same from time 
to time,” while subsection 6 stated the Board could “grant or refuse in 
the absolute discretion of the Board licenses for the sale or consign-
ment of fish to a designated market.” It had authority to determine 
what brokers would be used to sell fish in markets and to organize 
groups or associations of exporters to co-ordinate the sale of fish. Thus, 
the Board had complete regulatory authority over fish exporters, 
which enabled it to grant or refuse in its “absolute discretion” licenses 
for the sale or consignment of fish to a designated market. The Com-
mission established under separate legislation the Salt Codfish Asso-
ciation, appointed by the Governor-in-Commission from among 
exporters as an advisory body to the Board.10
The government effectively created a separate department of fish-
eries without placing a Commissioner solely in charge. As Gushue 
observed to Hope Simpson on 21 July 1936, the main function of the 
Fisheries Board was to “perform the administrative work of the Gov-
ernment in relation to fisheries — in other words, it is the Department 
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of Fisheries.”11 On 24 April 1936 the Board approved Portugal as a 
designated market and fish exporters subsequently organized into a 
co-operative marketing organization, the Portugal Exporters Group 
(PEG). The London-based firm Hawes & Company was appointed as 
PEG’s broker for the sale of Newfoundland fish. The Board intended 
to organize similar organizations for markets in Greece, Spain, and 
Puerto Rico, all three of which were also approved for designation in 
1936.12 Such organizations would bring an end to a “completely unco-
ordinated mass of individual endeavours”13 with co-operative market-
ing subsequently put in place for several other markets.
Designating Puerto Rico in 1938
Civil war in Spain and greater regulatory control over fish markets by 
the respective governments in Portugal and Italy had greatly reduced 
the market for Newfoundland salt codfish in the late 1930s, prompt-
ing exporters14 and the Fisheries Board to look for increasing oppor-
tunities in the Caribbean. By 1938 Puerto Rico had become a growing 
and important outlet. Board member John Cheeseman15 and Claude 
Fraser,16 secretary for the Department of Natural Resources, had visited 
Puerto Rico in December 1937 to assess market conditions and rec-
ommended that a central selling organization of exporters be set up 
for Puerto Rico. Salt codfish from the Canadian Maritimes had dom-
inated that market but Newfoundland exports were a close second. In 
fact, by 1932 Newfoundland’s exports to Puerto Rico surpassed those 
of Canada, because of a reduction in the Lunenburg banking fleet and 
because the Newfoundland product caught off Labrador was being 
sold at much lower prices than the Lunenburg bank codfish, which 
was of a better cure quality. Several of the large Puerto Rican import-
ers had agents in St. John’s, while St. John’s exporter A.H. Murray and 
Company had its own subsidiary company in Puerto Rico from 1937 
to compete with importers there.17 Fish-buying in Puerto Rico was 
practically in the hands of local Newfoundland firms, and the primary 
concern of the Newfoundland agents, Fisheries Board chair Gushue 
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informed Natural Resources Commissioner Robert Ewbank in Octo-
ber 1938,18 was to buy fish “as cheaply as possible.” At a general meet-
ing of its members on 24 September the Salt Codfish Association 
approved the idea of a co-operative marketing group based on a divi-
sion of sales among its members for Puerto Rico.19
The Board was determined to control how Newfoundland export-
ers would manage their access to the Puerto Rican market. It began 
negotiations with the Association exporters over how to establish this 
market division, reminding exporters that all sales to Puerto Rico were 
conditional on their having an approved export license from the Board 
in consideration of the forthcoming formation of a co-operative 
marketing group. As part of the negotiations, the Board reached an 
understanding with the Association that a minimum price set by the 
government could be paid to fishermen by exporters for the purchase 
of Labrador salt codfish. The government set aside $300,000 in its 
1938–39 budget for financial assistance to the fishery, to be applied to 
a guarantee for Labrador fish sold in markets approved by the Board. 
The Association and the Board agreed that parties having made sales 
at lower prices than those set by the Board must clear them by 29 
October and were to be notified of this decision so that the exporters’ 
group could commence its work on 1 November when Puerto Rican 
importer Emiliano Mendez, the owner of Mendez & Company, was 
due in St. John’s to discuss sales with Puerto Rico Exporters Ltd, 
which had been incorporated on 25 October 1938.20 The Board wanted 
a contract for 100,000 quintals at $8.25 per barrel effective 1 Novem-
ber,21 conditional that no other fish would go to Puerto Rico from 
Newfoundland at a lower price.22
Resistance from Holmes
Not all exporters welcomed the Fisheries Board’s determination to 
bring regulatory order to the marketing of fish. One was Great War 
veteran Arthur Chesley Holmes (1896–1952),23 who in early January 
1938 published a series of letters in the press arguing the merits of 
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private industry over government control of business. He described 
the Board’s role as “interference.” Holmes argued that in Portugal, 
where such control existed, regulation had not led to higher prices for 
Newfoundland fish and claimed that the Board did not understand 
consumer demands for salt codfish.24 Holmes was drawing on his prior 
experience in that country, when he had lived in Oporto as an importer 
of Newfoundland fish from the 1920s until the 1936 Board-led for-
mation of PEG. His criticisms foretold the difficulties that he would 
soon encounter with the new Puerto Rican arrangements.
In 1938 Holmes was the Newfoundland agent for Sobrino de 
Izquierdo Inc. of San Juan, one of Puerto Rico’s major fish importers.25 
He had contracted on 1 September to purchase 6,000 barrels (12,000 
quintals) of Labrador codfish at $7 per barrel from St. John’s-based 
Monroe Export Co Ltd between 15 September and 15 November 
1938. Holmes applied to the Board on 20 October for unrestricted 
export licenses for shipments up to 15 November. Holmes closed one 
shipment with a license from the Board but was verbally informed at 
the time of application that he could not have any unrestricted licenses 
for shipments after 29 October because of the higher price of $8.25 
effective at the beginning of November, which the Board had estab-
lished for fish to be sold by Puerto Rico Exporters Ltd. The Board 
instructed Holmes that he could make another shipment at $7/barrel 
to Puerto Rico and to ship it before 1 November when the new mar-
keting group would be fully in operation. As he did not expect to ship 
his fish by this date, Holmes applied once more to the Board for a li-
cense to ship later, which the Board refused. However, it wrote Holmes 
on 22 October that his fish could be included in the 100,000 quintals 
the Board was arranging as a sale to Puerto Rico. (Presumably, this 
was problematic for Holmes because that fish was to sell at $8.25 but 
Holmes had contracted to sell at $7.)
When he was refused a second license, Holmes’s solicitor, Ed-
mund J. Phelan,26 applied on 29 October to the Supreme Court for a 
writ of mandamus requiring the Board to issue Holmes a license to 
sell the 6,000 barrels of codfish to Sobrino.27 The Court considered 
277
The 1938 Holmes Case
newfoundland and labrador studies, 34, 2 (2019)
1719-1726
the writ two days later, and on 2 November the Supreme Court regis-
trar, William R. Howley,28 issued an order for the Fisheries Board to 
show cause by 4 November why the writ should not be issued. Court 
Justices Kent and Higgins29 heard the facts in the case on Thursday 10 
November and issued a peremptory writ. Their judgment ordered the 
Board to allow Holmes his license to sell 6,000 barrels of codfish up to 
15 November 1938. The Court held that section 9, subsection 6 of the 
1936 Fisheries Board Act must be read in conjunction with subsection 
5, which gave the Board power, subject to the approval of the Governor- 
in-Commission, to make rules and regulations that had to be pub-
lished in the Newfoundland Gazette and come into effect from the date 
of publication of the rules and regulations. The Court ruled that “no 
such rules or regulations have been either made or published” con-
cerning the newly designated market in Puerto Rico and “we do not 
think the Board has, in the absence of such rules, an arbitrary right to 
refuse the issue of licenses under sub-section 4 but are of opinion that 
the absolute discretion given it must be exercised within the scope of 
such rules and regulations.” Therefore, the withholding of a license to 
Holmes was not “justified” and, according to the justices, he was “enti-
tled to have the license issued to him in the terms of his application.”30
The Court’s decision presented grave consequences for the govern-
ment’s ongoing efforts to regulate the fishery in general and, in partic-
ular, to establish co-operative organizations. The following day Gushue, 
the Fisheries Board chairman, warned Commissioner Ewbank of the 
“awkward situation . . . created” by the Court’s action because of the 
contract Puerto Rico Exporters Ltd on 8 November had signed with 
Mendez for a minimum of 100,000 quintals of Labrador fish at $8.25 
per barrel. Mendez had also agreed to pay 50 cents per barrel as a fi-
nancial penalty that Puerto Rico Exporters Ltd would hold in the 
event he failed to take the 100,000 quintals. By getting an additional 
$1.25 per barrel for Labrador fish, as compared, for example, with the 
price for which Holmes had contracted, Gushue believed the Puerto 
Rican market would be placed on a profitable basis and there would be 
no need for a government guarantee contribution in this market, while 
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avoiding any possibility of American countervailing duties being im-
posed because of the Newfoundland government’s price guarantee, 
which the Americans would regard as a subsidy. Mendez told New-
foundland exporters that he would not make the contract if a license 
was granted to Holmes under the mandamus proceedings. Gushue 
advised the government that the “situation created by this judgment 
[ought] to be remedied promptly, otherwise the effectiveness of the 
various forms of marketing control will be impaired,” and he urged the 
government to apply to the Court for a clearer definition.31
Ewbank’s subsequent memorandum prepared for a Commission 
meeting later on 12 November emphasized that the position was even 
more difficult than Gushue had described. He argued that if Holmes 
were to be allowed to ship his fish to Sabrino, “the great rival of Men-
dez,” that would allow Sabrino to put his fish on the market and keep 
prices at $7 for three months, by which time Mendez’s contract would 
have been “completely torpedoed.” Moreover, Ewbank believed this 
situation would encourage others to similarly defy the Board and 
would lead to the “complete breakup of the Marketing System and an 
immense increase in the liability under our guarantee would result. If 
the order stands Government cannot refrain from taking some action.” 
Ewbank said Attorney General L.E. Emerson32 would appear at the 
Supreme Court “this morning and hopes to reverse their order. If he 
succeeds all is well.” If not, there were “two things that we must guard 
against.” First, that Holmes would export fish to Puerto Rico at the $7 
price because of his license. Second, the position “must be rectified so 
that the High Court will not issue another Mandamus.” On the first 
point, Ewbank said the government was naturally “most adverse to 
undertaking retroactive legislation or to following a course which di-
rectly challenges the Mandamus issued by the High Court.” Ewbank 
suggested to Emerson that if “we can rush through legislation which 
puts an additional hurdle in the way of exporters of fish to Puerto 
Rico for three months at once, the Fisheries Board can obey the High 
Court and we can bring Mr. Holmes down at the new hurdle. If this 
was done quickly there would be no need of retrospective effect.” On 
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the second point, he acknowledged the difficulty in framing regula-
tions since prices and market conditions varied daily and it was impos-
sible to cover all eventualities. Legal remedy was only necessary if 
Emerson’s motion failed on an appeal of the mandamus.33
On Saturday morning 12 November, Emerson filed a motion at a 
Supreme Court hearing for the judgment to be amended or corrected. 
But the Court upheld its prior decision. When the Fisheries Board 
then issued Holmes his license at 4:45 p.m., Holmes already had his 
fish loaded aboard a steamer at St. John’s for Halifax and then for 
transshipment to Puerto Rico. When Holmes went to Harvey & 
Company, the steamer’s agent, with the new license, company officials 
informed him that instructions had been issued by Customs that the 
SS Magnhild was not to be cleared for leaving the port of St. John’s 
without a special permit necessary under new legislation the Commis-
sion had passed earlier that afternoon.34 Holmes then held Harvey & 
Company legally liable for any damage to the fish and the government 
and the Fisheries Board liable for all loss, damages, costs, charges, and 
expenses resulting from the refusal to permit the export of the cargo.35
To prevent the loss of the more lucrative Mendez contract, the 
government that same day had held its special meeting enacting new 
legislation, “An Act to Prohibit the Export of Codfish save under Per-
mit for Export.” It would prevent anybody in Newfoundland from 
shipping any fish to anywhere in the world without first getting an 
individual permit from the Fisheries Board. The legislation also ad-
dressed the Board’s authority in designated markets, giving it the nec-
essary administrative powers and making it clear that the Board had 
the absolute right to grant or refuse licenses. The Act required a special 
additional permit for export, which could be granted or refused by the 
Board without assigning any reason for refusal.36 Holmes responded 
the next day (Sunday) with a press interview that was published the 
following day. He denied he had received any offer from the govern-
ment and said that the Court saw the Board’s action as an illegal at-
tempt to enforce a higher minimum price per barrel on his principal’s 
fish, which was already contracted for $7 per barrel. The Board’s offer 
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to ship some of the Monroe-contracted fish with the marketing group 
was made in a letter to him dated 22 October before the new market-
ing group had begun operation, before Mendez’s arrival in St. John’s 
on 31 October, and before the conclusion of the Board-approved 
Mendez 100,000-quintal contract with Puerto Rico Exporters. 
Holmes suggested that this offer was disingenuous as the marketing 
group would not allow his principal to acquire the fish at $7 per barrel.37 
Before the matter had reached the Court, Holmes claimed that he had 
offered a compromise: “I offered to take the fish out of the country in 
small lots so as not to disturb the Puerto Rico market; my offer was 
refused. I offered any reasonable guarantee that whether the fish went 
forward in small lots or big lots, that selling prices in Puerto Rico 
would not be less than those compatible with Board prices; my offer 
was refused.” Even after the mandamus was issued, Holmes claimed 
he tried to compromise “by offering to store the fish in Halifax pend-
ing Board instructions, as well as giving a letter of guarantee that not 
a quintal of the fish would be forwarded to Puerto Rico without the 
consent of the Board.” Holmes asserted that “all through I have shown 
the utmost goodwill but have met with nothing except [obstinacy] 
and unreasonableness.” Holmes had written Gushue of the Fisheries 
Board on 26 October offering to discuss with him “ways and means of 
securing the best possible solution of the many problems confronting 
exporters in Newfoundland and importers in Puerto Rico.” Holmes 
received no reply, “written or verbal.”38
As far as Gushue was concerned, Holmes had deliberately chosen 
to ignore the Fisheries Board’s policies to regulate the Puerto Rican 
market. Because of the Board’s past dealings with Holmes in the Por-
tuguese market, Gushue later told Ewbank that the Board “as a matter 
of fact” had been “careful to give Mr. Holmes the fairest possible treat-
ment because of certain contentious decisions which the Board was 
forced to make against Mr. Holmes. . . . Quite frankly, I think that 
Mr. Holmes has to be watched and that is why, as I have said above, for 
some time I have never had a conversation with him without another 
person present.”39 Regardless of Gushue’s assessment of Holmes, the 
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action of the Commission in passing legislation immediately after the 
Court had upheld Holmes’s rights generated controversy.
Public Response
The Commission of Government quickly realized it might face strong 
public criticism for its new legislation. Recognizing that the “action 
taken by us can be represented as an arbitrary interference by an irre-
sponsible executive government with the rights of an individual as 
established in the High Court,” Ewbank acted promptly, releasing a 
statement on Monday 14 November that he hoped would “suffice to 
prevent agitation on these lines.”40 The government believed it had 
acted to protect the co-operative group marketing system a majority 
of exporters to Puerto Rico had wanted established.41 Ewbank em-
phasized the reasonableness of the Fisheries Board in offering Holmes 
the opportunity, in order to “protect” his interests, to hand his fish over 
to the Puerto Rico Exporters on the understanding that it would 
come into the 100,000 quintals already negotiated to be sold at $8.25 
per two-quintal barrel, but it was an offer Holmes refused. The Com-
mission and the Fisheries Board received the qualified support of the 
Evening Telegram, one of St. John’s two major daily newspapers. Editor 
Charles Jeffery42 acknowledged that nothing but the “best intentions 
can be attributed to the Fisheries Board” in order to protect the value 
of fish exports, but he also added that the passing of legislation, fol-
lowing the Court’s decision, would “seem to involve a very important 
principle and might result in the establishment of a dangerous prece-
dent.” The Supreme Court had been asked to interpret a ruling by the 
Board and judgment was given as the law stood.43
The other major daily newspaper, the Daily News, which was gen-
erally critical of the Commission of Government in the late 1930s, 
swiftly condemned the new legislation and the British-appointed 
Commission of Government in general, characterizing the “Holmes 
case” a “local cause celebre.”44 Even more critical was journalist, busi-
nessman, and Commission critic Albert Perlin.45 He wrote in his 
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weekly newspaper, the Observer’s Weekly, that the government had 
chosen “as it had a legal right to do, to make the fullest use of the 
dictatorial powers with which, by the constitution, it has been entrusted. 
It would have been more tactful to compromise.” Perlin quoted from a 
letter Hope Simpson published in March 1934 in his newspaper 
where the former Commissioner had said that “it is clear to us, as it 
must be clear to everyone that no measures which do not command 
the consent of the moral sense of the people of Newfoundland can be 
enforced or be effective.” However, Perlin did not believe that this was 
the case of a government abusing its powers; rather, the Commission 
“honestly thought it was doing the best possible in the national inter-
est.” But this was “beside the point,” he wrote, because there should be 
“safeguards in the form of regulation of legislative processes which 
would permit the public to know what is planned and to offer an ex-
pression of opinion upon the Government’s policy as set forth in leg-
islation. The present makes this need all the more apparent and I trust 
that steps will soon be taken to provide the necessary safeguards for 
the protection of our democratic principles as well as for the protec-
tion of the Government’s own interests.”46 The weekly Port Union-
based The Fishermen’s Advocate, once the official newspaper of the 
Fishermen’s Protective Union, weighed in on 18 November about the 
“considerable comment” on “Holmes’ Case.” Despite being a strong 
critic of the undemocratic nature of the Commission, the newspaper 
cautioned that there were “so many sides to this question” and “so 
many facts connected with it which [have] not yet come out” that it 
was impossible for the newspaper to “hold, much less express, any fast 
or firm opinion.”47
The Court decision also had had some potential implications for 
Britain’s commercial relationship with the United States. Because 
Holmes’s buyer in Puerto Rico was a business incorporated under 
American law, the Daily News asked the American assistant consul 
general at St. John’s, Charles C. Sundell, what action had been taken 
by the consulate in connection with the non-shipment of Holmes’s 
codfish, only to be told that the matter had been referred to the State 
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Department in Washington.48 Consequently, Holmes informed the 
press that his principals in Puerto Rico were compelled to purchase 
their supplies of codfish from other producing countries.49 Sobrino 
appealed to the United States government, which instructed its con-
sular general at St. John’s to lodge a formal protest against the special 
legislation.50 Ewbank then met with Consul General Harold B. 
Quarton,51 who had been instructed by American Secretary of State 
Cordell Hall to raise two main issues with Ewbank, Quarton having 
been kept informed of the matter by Holmes.52 The first was to see if 
the agent for the Puerto Rican firm had exhausted his legal remedies 
and the second was to express his government’s view that there were 
no justifiable grounds for the action of the Commission of Govern-
ment in passing special legislation and refusing a special permit for 
the export of fish in fulfillment of a contract previously concluded in 
good faith. The US official also indicated that his government consid-
ered the action surprising, given that the United States was then con-
cluding trade agreements with Canada and the United Kingdom that 
would provide real benefits to Newfoundland fishing interests and 
fishery exports to the United States. In response, Ewbank promised 
Quarton the “fullest possible statement of the facts of the case as 
known to us, and of the reasons which led to the action which we have 
taken,” and a detailed summary followed.53 Fortunately, that trade 
agreement did not unravel as a result of this matter. It was signed in 
Washington on 17 November and provided for duties to be reduced 
on salt codfish from Newfoundland. Newfoundland’s interests in the 
negotiations were overseen by Finance Commissioner J.H. Penson54 
and by Gushue of the Fisheries Board.55
The Newfoundland Board of Trade roundly criticized the Com-
mission’s action. The Board at this time was also unhappy with the 
Commission’s policy in giving significant timber concessions in the 
Gander area to the new owners of the pulp and paper mill at Corner 
Brook, the English-owned Bowater-Lloyd Group.56 It subsequently 
passed a resolution declaring “its unqualified disapproval of the drastic 
action of the Newfoundland Commission of Government.”57 The 
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special Act was a “dangerous principle” adopted by a non-elected gov-
ernment whose “proceedings are conducted and whose legislative 
powers are exercised in private” and “tending to discredit the Rule of 
Law by which this country should be governed, to weaken Judicial 
authority in effectively upholding the civil rights of our people, and to 
awaken a feeling of insecurity in the public mind.” In supporting the 
Commission’s efforts in 1935 and 1936 to establish the Fisheries 
Board, the Board of Trade never envisaged the Fisheries Board would 
have so much “autocratic authority.” It preferred the self-regulation of 
fish exports by trade committees and requested the immediate repeal 
of the 1938 special legislation.58
Ewbank responded to Board of Trade president Geoffrey Milling 
on 2 December. He claimed that the government had acted with 
“great reluctance” in enacting emergency legislation to prevent what 
the Supreme Court had regarded as the “lawful” completion of a com-
mercial transaction. The Commission was worried that its action 
might be misinterpreted as “showing the lack of that regard for the 
authority of the Courts which it is the duty of the Commission of 
Government at all times to observe.” The Commission had carefully 
considered an alternative but concluded that it had no time to pursue 
other options to the course adopted. The government had to act quickly 
to stop an “innocuous” transaction to prevent damaging a “scheme of 
orderly marketing of salt codfish, which had been laboriously and with 
great difficulty built up in consultation and co-operation with the 
Trade.” Ewbank assured the Board president that the action taken on 
this occasion in “wholly exceptional circumstances” was not in any 
“sense a precedent to be followed in future.”59 There was no intention 
to lessen the authority of the Fisheries Board unless the salt codfish 
export industry found itself in a position to “develop from within a 
cohesive organization whose authority in regard to price levels and 
control of marketing generally would be accepted by the fishermen 
and the export industry as a whole.” The government preferred to leave 
the detailed working of marketing plans to the private sector and “con-
fine themselves to general supervision and to assisting the organization 
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by the exercise of their authority and powers.” The government could 
not “accept responsibility” unless it also had “power.”60
Reaction in London
Commissioners were also concerned about how their actions might be 
perceived in the British House of Commons. On 14 November Ewbank 
wrote P.A. Clutterbuck, an official in the Dominions Office who was 
regarded as the Newfoundland expert, sending background informa-
tion on the Holmes “incident in connection with the fish market 
which may possibly form the subject of questions in the House [of 
Commons].” He acknowledged that the “action taken by us can be 
represented as an arbitrary interference by an irresponsible executive 
government with the rights of an individual as established in the High 
Court.” Ewbank said they had been “in close touch with the Judges of 
the High Court and they have said candidly that they expected some 
action of the kind.” On Sunday, 13 November, he had lunched with 
Justice Kent and “can say that there is no sense of resentment on their 
part at all at the action taken, no suggestion that the Executive Gov-
ernment are slighting the High Court and no friction between us.”61
One champion of Newfoundland democratic rights in the House 
of Commons was British Tory MP Brendan Bracken, a journalist and 
newspaper publisher,62 who on 21 November questioned Malcolm 
MacDonald, the Secretary of State for the Dominions,63 on when 
Newfoundland could expect Dominion status to be restored. Mac-
Donald informed Bracken that Newfoundland was not self-supporting 
and would not be “for a considerable time to come.” The constitutional 
change in 1934 had taken place “at the request of the people of New-
foundland themselves.”64 On 6 December Bracken again questioned 
MacDonald, asking would he issue immediate instructions to the 
Commission of Government to refrain from legislation that tended to 
“weaken the judiciary in upholding the civil rights of the people of 
Newfoundland.” He then wrote MacDonald that the Holmes case 
was a “very grave development in affairs of the British Empire when a 
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Dominion Government over-rules the judgment of a Supreme Court.” 
MacDonald replied that the legislation had been passed in “very 
special circumstances” and that the “significance of it has been consid-
erably exaggerated in such reports as he may have received,” a view 
Bracken disputed.65 MacDonald explained to Bracken that the Com-
mission had found it necessary to pass further legislation “remedying 
the defect in the Act which had been brought to light by the judgment 
of the Supreme Court.” It was clear, he wrote Bracken, that from the 
Commission’s public statement on the new legislation, there was no 
“desire on their part to interfere arbitrarily with the rights of an indi-
vidual as established by the Court, and that their action resulted solely 
from the necessity for protecting the interests of the trade generally 
and ensuring to exporters an economic price for their fish.”66
Bracken was having none of MacDonald’s political response. “The 
affairs of the Fish Trade in Newfoundland may have given great con-
cern to the Commission of Government,” Bracken replied on 16 De-
cember, but, he added, if he were a Newfoundlander then he would 
have been much more “concerned by the Government’s disregard for 
the Supreme Court.” As Newfoundlanders no longer possessed the 
right of self-government, Bracken asserted that their only “protection 
against misrule is the right to appeal to the Courts. But if the decision 
of the judges can be immediately nullified by a private meeting of the 
Commissioners, citizens may rightly feel that the prosperity of the 
Fish Trade is less important than their limited civic rights.” MacDon-
ald continued to support the Commission; its decision, he reminded 
Bracken, should not be regarded in any “sense as a precedent for the 
future or as implying any lack of ‘that regard for the authority of the 
Courts which it is the duty and the wish of the Commission of Gov-
ernment at all times to observe.’” Britain’s desire to return democracy 
to Newfoundland was well understood by its people, and to make it 
self-supporting again, despite the poor international economic situa-
tion, “we can only do our best to carry it through these times of stress 
and to build up the earning power and the staying power of its small 
population.”67
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The Holmes case had caused “something of a stir in Newfound-
land,” Clutterbuck informed a senior official of the Foreign Office on 
2 January 1939. The Foreign Office was “soon allayed by the public 
statements” made by the Commission, who acted quickly to explain its 
policy to the Newfoundland people.68 In a 31 December 1938 dispatch 
to Governor Walwyn,69 MacDonald notified him that the British 
government approved of the amending legislation,70 while Sir E.C. 
Machtig,71 assistant undersecretary at the Dominions Office, wrote 
Walwyn on 2 January 1939 that “it is hoped that we shall now hear no 
more of the matter” as the Commission did the “only thing possible in 
the circumstances.”72 In late December Gushue initiated discussions 
with Holmes’s lawyers to reach a settlement to the dispute. The gov-
ernment accepted the principle that a claim for expenses was incurred 
as a result of the legislation it had reluctantly adopted to protect New-
foundland’s marketing policy in Puerto Rico. In turn, Holmes agreed 
to co-operate with the Puerto Rico Exporters Limited in future fish 
sales to Puerto Rico.73 The outbreak of war in Europe in 1939 and the 
Commission’s mobilization of the Island’s human and natural resources 
for the Allied war effort not only silenced the Commission’s critics, 
but also fundamentally changed the economic and financial situation 
in Newfoundland through the establishment of several American and 
Canadian military bases that provided considerable employment and 
lessened the people’s dependency on the salt-cod fishery.
Conclusion
The Holmes case highlighted the determination of the Commission of 
Government through the Fisheries Board to bring regulatory order to 
a marketing system in the salt codfish industry that had long been 
characterized by excessive competition and rivalry. But it also illus-
trates how that unelected government had overstepped its authority 
by impeding Holmes’s rights and undermining the authority of the 
judicial system. Holmes had a voice in the courts by way of a manda-
mus as an avenue to bring his views and issues before the public. The 
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Supreme Court granted him his remedy, but the Commission neutral-
ized that by enacting retrospective legislation overruling the judicial 
system. The non-elective nature of the government allowed it to act 
swiftly, in the absence of debate in a legislature, to bring all aspects of 
the administrative and legal systems to bear to remedy a serious legal 
challenge to the regulatory authority of the Fisheries Board. However, 
the Commission was sensitive to public opinion and used the court 
case, both then and later, to explain better its general public policy. 
Meanwhile, the Fisheries Board emerged from the Holmes case of 
1938 stronger and with more support from the business community. 
The Board strengthened its co-operative marketing organizations in 
other designated markets, which led in 1947 to it organizing all salt 
codfish exporters into one marketing organization, the Newfoundland 
Association of Fish Exporters Limited.74
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